
The Economist
IN AALSMEER, in the Netherlands, the full flower of global agriculture is
on display, quite literally. Most mornings 18m blooms go on parade in an
auction that attracts 1,600 buyers, either on the spot or via the Internet.
Most afternoons, 4m flowers and potted plants arrive by air from Israel,
Kenya, Ecuador, South Africa and other foreign horticultural hotspots.
Inside the world's largest covered building, they are graded for quality,
catalogued by computer and prepared for their moment of judgment. Once
purchased, the flowers are whisked off to markets throughout the European
Union, Japan and America, all on the same day.
This floral United Nations is an impressive sight, but as a rule global
agricultural trade is far less fragrant. Farming is one of the most
distorted sectors of the world economy. Despite promises to liberalise,
domestic support policies, import barriers and export subsidies in many
industrialised countries remain formidable hurdles to the free flow of
goods. This hurts farmers in the developing world as well as consumers in
protected markets. It also makes farmers less responsive to changes in
demand. Conflicts over new methods of agricultural production, from genetic
modification to hormone treatment, add a further layer of complication.
Charity begins at home
Farming is full of curiosities, but none is more striking than the
disproportion between the size of the farming population and its political
influence in rich countries. In North America and the EU, farmers make up
less than 5% of the labour force and contribute less than 2% of GDP, yet
they are able to wring remarkably generous levels of financial support out
of their governments. This may be precisely because there are so few of
them: in absolute terms, the cost of dissuading French farmers from
blockading Paris will be relatively small. Only a few industrial countries,
forming a loose organisation known as the Cairns Group, have stripped their
farmers of most of their subsidies.
In 1998, OECD countries paid out $360 billion in agricultural support. The
highest rates of support were paid to rice, milk and sugar producers, with
the biggest generally getting the most. Some countries are far more
generous than others (see 4). For much of the 1990s, domestic farm support
in the industrialised world was on the wane, but since 1998 it has
ballooned in response to a collapse in commodity prices. For the past two
years in America, Congress has approved a total of $15 billion-worth of
emergency farm aid. Cynics note that this largesse happens to coincide with
the run-up to presidential and congressional elections.
Most of the money to cushion the farmers is stumped up by consumers, via
government manipulation of domestic prices to boost farmers' earnings.
According to OECD calculations, consumers in the industrial world pay about
a third more for their food than they would without government support for
farmers.
There is no doubt that agriculture is different from other industries, not
only because its product, food, is so essential and so emotive, but also
because it has the capacity to create, or destroy, a number of public
goods, from ecological diversity to animal welfare to rural landscapes. The
question is how to pay for these benefits. Some governments, notably in the
EU and Japan, have argued that it is worth spending quite a lot of money to
encourage farmers to maintain their "multifunctionality". But indirect
measures such as price supports are a crude and inefficient way of
achieving that. Better to acknowledge these aims openly and pay direct from
government budgets.
Trading insults
In 1998, $456 billion-worth of agricultural goods was traded across
borders, three times more than 20 years earlier. That seems an impressive
growth rate, but trade in manufactured goods has grown three times as fast
since the 1980s. Developing countries that have become trading successes,
such as Thailand and Brazil, now account for over a third of all
agricultural exports. Clearly, developing countries have reason to worry if
rich countries embrace domestic farm policies that bring down the price of
their goods in export markets, and clearly they are keen to see barriers to
their own exports removed. Pledges to reform were made in 1993, at the end
of the most recent set of world trade talks, the Uruguay round, but much
remains to be done. Tariffs on agricultural goods still run at an average
of 40%, compared with well under 10% for manufactures, and import quotas
remain tight.
But it is not just a matter of tariffs. Another sore point is the
subsidisation of exports -- the support rich countries provide to make
their agricultural surpluses competitive in export markets, thereby
undercutting the price of home-grown goods in poor countries. Under the
Uruguay round agreement, developed countries committed themselves to
reducing their export subsidies by 36% of their 1986-88 value for most
commodities by 2000. They have kept this promise, but have fallen down on
others, and show little sign of making further concessions.
The banana trade perfectly illustrates the need for more transparency and
liberalisation. Bananas are the world's most traded fruit. The EU imposes
strict quotas and high tariffs on bananas from efficient producers in Latin
America, while allowing free access to those from a handful of small
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. It claims it is providing aid by
giving growers from poor countries preferential access and good prices, but
the WTO disagrees, and has given its blessing to the imposition by America
of $191m-worth of retaliatory measures. According to Brent Borrell of the
Centre for International Economics in Canberra, Australia, the policy has
driven down demand in the EU and reduced prices in the rest of the world.
Research by Kym Anderson, of the University of Adelaide, suggests that
stripping such distortions from the OECD's agricultural policies would
boost global agricultural trade by more than half, making the OECD and the
developing world $160 billion better off between them. On the other hand,
international food prices would rise by up to 5% over a decade. That is an
alarming prospect for countries concerned about the security of their food
supplies, especially for the many countries in sub-Saharan Africa that
import more food than they export. What if the price or supply of food were
to see-saw wildly, causing mass hunger and riots in the streets? Do not
worry, say many economists: freer trade will provide steadier food
supplies, and may bring gains in other industries to help pay the bill.
Besides, none of this will happen overnight. Under a mandate from the
Uruguay round, agricultural talks have to start this year, but the latest
WTO meeting in Seattle last December, the successor to the Uruguay round,
failed to launch a comprehensive new round.
For any country determined to keep food imports out, science can be another
handy tool. Under a section of the WTO rules known as the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement, a country is entitled to restrict imports if
they compromise human, animal or plant health. This covers things like
insects, viruses or chemicals that may be imported along with foodstuffs.
International standards in this area are set by bodies which the SPS
Agreement acknowledges as authorities, such as Codex Alimentarius, a joint
body of the World Health Organisation and the Food and Agriculture
Organisation. But there is a fine line between protection and
protectionism, and it is tempting for local producers to keep out foreign
competition by invoking food safety or environmental concerns. The
exporting country can dispute the claim, and if a WTO panel rules that the
restrictions are not scientifically justified the importing country may
face trade sanctions.
Precautionary tales
But what if the science is in dispute? This is what has happened in the
long-running feud between America and the EU over hormone-treated beef. The
EU has imposed a ban on imports from America and Canada of beef from cows
treated with hormones. The EU's scientific advisory body on the issue
claims that some of the hormones could cause cancer in consumers, whereas
scientists at Codex Alimentarius say the levels found in American beef are
safe. America has the WTO's approval to raise its tariffs on certain
imports until the EU relents or proves its case.
And what if the science is not conclusive, as in the argument over
genetically modified foods? The EU has prohibited imports of many varieties
of GM cereals and has put on hold the expansion of commercial plantings of
genetically modified crops in some member states. It argues that there is
insufficient scientific evidence to conclude there is no risk to consumers
from genetically modified foodstuffs, or to the environment from such
crops. It has invoked the "precautionary principle", which is a fancy term
for a simple idea: better safe than sorry.
But America, Canada and Argentina, which have a vested interest in the free
flow of genetically modified foods, argue that, after four years of
widespread cultivation, there are plenty of data to show that the
technology poses no more risks to consumers or their countryside than
conventionally bred crops. They have long opposed labelling, favoured by
consumer groups, since it would single out GM products on the basis of how
they were produced, which WTO rules frown upon. The two sides have now come
a little closer to each other with the creation in January of a "biosafety
protocol", laying down strict rules for exporters of GM products, including
elaborate notification procedures.
As yet, the WTO has no special body to advise on whether new provisions are
needed for genetically modified food or old ones can be adapted, but
creating such a body would be a worthwhile investment. For the moment,
genetically modified crops make up only a small fraction of global
commodity production, but their derivatives find their way into countless
processed foods, so the share of goods affected by trade barriers is much
larger than the share of the total crop. And as more traits are introduced
and more countries choose to plant the stuff, the International Service for
the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications reckons that the market will
increase fourfold to $8 billion by 2005. The controversy is set to grow
too, but robust trade regulations should help mitigate some of the risks.
** NOTICE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material is distributed for research and educational purposes only. ** |
|
|
Last Updated on 3/28/00 By Rachel C. Benbrook Email: karen@biotech-info.net |
|