
Ashish Kothari Kalpavriksh - Environmental Action Group Pune, India BIO-IPR (submitted to:) February 2000
NOTE: The author has worked on biodiversity issues for several years, and is
currently Coordinator of the Technical and Policy Core Group to formulate
the Government of India's National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan. He
is a founder-member of Kalpavriksh, a 20 year old environmental action group
which has focused on issues of conservation and development, including
policy matters related to wild and agricultural biodiversity. For a
formatted Word version of this paper, please write ashish@nda.vsnl.net.in.
INTRODUCTION: WHAT SHOULD THE PLANT VARIETIES BILL ACHIEVE?
On December 14, 1999, the Government of India introduced into Parliament the
Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers' Rights Bill, 1999. Soon after, it
was decided to have this Bill (PPV Bill, for short), examined by a Joint
Committee of Members of Parliament. This Committee, chaired by Sahib Singh
Verma, is currently seeking public inputs to the Bill, and is expected to
finish its task by late February.
The urgent question before the Committee should be: does the PPV Bill meet
the objectives that the Government claims it will, viz., improve India's
food security by providing incentives for better and stepped up breeding of
new crop varieties? Or does it actually lead the country away from such
security?
This question cannot be answered without recourse to a more fundamental
question: what constitutes a nation's food security? By now, it is clear
that a simple aggregate figure of foodgrains output is not an adequate
measure of food security. We need to know if this food is reaching where it
should (especially to the poor), and if the costs incurred in producing this
food are ecologically and financially sustainable within India's resources.
The current models of agricultural development appear not to meet either of
these indicators, even if they are resulting in higher aggregate foodgrains
output. A third or more of the country's population still does not have
enough quality food, or simply enough food, to eat. And increasingly, it is
apparent that the enormous economic subsidies involved in fertilisers and
other inputs, the country-wide degradation of soils and poisoning of water,
the contamination of the food itself by chemical residues, the debilitating
dependence of farmers on centralised bureaucracies and markets, and the
reduction in diversity of seeds, livestock, and farm practices, are leading
us more and more into a dead-end alley.
National food security can only be achieved if these issues are addressed.
It would of course be unfair to expect any law to do this by itself, and I
do not intend to take on the PPV Bill on all these counts. However, what is
absolutely clear is that any legislation purporting to ensure "food
security" by providing incentives for greater crop production, must be
assessed in terms of not only whether it will indeed lead to greater
production, but also what kind of crops, on whose lands, and to whose
benefit? The production of new varieties, by the corporate sector, does not
necessarily benefit farmers, especially when it ties them up to increasing
dependence on markets and bureaucracies. Privatised intellectual property
rights (IPRs), such as patents and plant breeders' rights, would only
increase this trend, apart from raising ethical issues of IPRs on life
forms. And past experience suggests that varieties developed in the formal
sector often actually displace valuable crop diversity on farmers' fields.
All this leads, in the long run, to greater instability, depedence, and
unsustainability in farmers' lives…and hence in the national agricultual
sector as a whole.
The litmus test then is: does the PPV Bill enable farmers to stand on their
own feet (is it truly a "Farmers' Rights" Bill as it claims?), and the
indigenous seed breeding and production sector to blossom in the service of
the farmer and the nation's consumers? Will it actually lead us to greater
food security?
Unfortunately, despite a number of progressive clauses in the Bill, the
answer is a clear NO. The PPV Bill emerges as a legislation that will end up
benefiting the large seed corporations, some very large farmers, and
corporate farming agencies. In so doing, it will be playing into the hands
of those in the international arena who pushed agreements such as WTO (and
in particular, the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)
regime). It will do little to facilitate genuine food security in terms of
feeding the poor and ensuring sustainable agricultural production through
protecting the rights of small farmers and the small-scale seed sector. This
is a pity, because India could well exploit loopholes in TRIPs, and the
solid mandate given to it by the international Convention on Biological
Diversity, to push forward a boldly different plant varieties protection
legislation. It can still do so, if the Joint Parliamentary Committee is
appraised of these issues and willing to take cognizance of them.
ELEMENTS OF THE PPV BILL
Largely modeled on the 1978 version of the International Convention for the
Protection of New Plant Varieties (UPOV), an agreement signed mostly by the
industrial nations of the world, the PPV contains the following major
provisions:
Under the PPV Bill, a Plant Varieties and Farmers' Rights Protection
Authority will be established. This will be chaired by a person of eminence
in agriculture, and consist of various government officials from relevant
ministries and agencies. Committees of experts can be appointed by this
Authority. The PPV Bill also sets up a Plant Varieties Registry, with a
Registrar General and other Registrars to process applications. The Registry
will maintain a National Register of Plant Varieties, which are given
protection under the PPV Bill.
Violations will invite penalties ranging from 3 months to 2 years
imprisonment, and Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 10 lakhs fine.
DOES THE PPV BILL PROTECT FARMERS OR BREEDERS?
Though its name explicitly gives it a claim to protect farmers' rights, the
PPV Bill is in actuality much more weighed in favour of the formal sector
plant breeder. Even in the latter category, I will argue below that the Bill
will work to the advantage of the private corporate sector more than public
sector breeders.
The PPV Bill is meant primarily to provide incentives to the seed breeding
sector, in particular financial incentives. This, it is hoped, will lead to
continued and increased investment into plant breeding, and to innovations
in this field. Indirectly, the agricultural establishment hopes, this will
benefit farmers, as they will get access to 'improved' varieties.
The Background Note circulated to the Joint Committee members with the
PPV Bill, itself starts off on a dubious note. It recognises that the public
sector breeding programmes are not meeting the increasing needs of India's
farmers, and hence the growing importance of private (read: corporate)
sector breeding. Unfortunately, this entirely leaves out the critical
importance of a third sector…farmers themselves! Considering that for
thousands of years, our farmers have selected, bred, and used hundreds of
thousands of varieties of several hundred crop species, it is amazing that
the government does not even think it fit to mention them as possible
breeders. This continues the bias, built into agricultural planning for
decades, against the 'informal' sector, and perpetuates the image of farmers
as simply supplying the 'raw material' that the formal sector breeders use
to develop new varieties.
This bias permeates the PPV Bill, though there are some well-meaning
attempts at reducing it. Consider the following:
Even in the matter of approving a particular name ("denomination") for a
variety (Section 16), the Authority does not have the mandate to reject a
breeder's name even if it is already in use by a farming community, though
this could conceivably be developed as a specific regulation under Section
16(2,3). There is no penalty associated with 'stealing' such a name
(Sections 61-64).
Section 48 of the PPV Bill enables communities to make claims if they
believe they have contributed to the development of a variety for which
protection has been given. But the onus to prove this is on these
communities. How many farmers will even get to know about what has been
protected, whether their varieties or knowledge has been used or not, etc?
The PPV Bill does make it mandatory for applications to be advertised
(Section 17), but again, will such advertisements even reach the concerned
rural populations? The only consolation is that this right to make claims on
behalf of aggrieved farmers has also been given to NGOs or others, which
could in theory help in greater outreach.
Even if some farmers or others acting on their behalf do manage to make such
a claim, and the claim is upheld, their only consolation will be some
compensation that they might get, at the discretion of the Authority
(Section 48(3)). This too, indirectly, as the compensation amount will first
be deposited into the Gene Fund, and there is no provision to ensure that it
thereafter comes to the claimant! But worse, there is no clause to revoke
the protection if it is found that the applicant has unfairly appropriated
farmer/community resources or knowledge…indeed such a provision cannot be
made since, as stated above, the PPV Bill has no provisions for prior
consent of farmers.
The above elements make it clear that, despite undoubtedly progressive
elements such as community rights to claim compensation, benefit-sharing
arrangements, compulsory licensing under certain conditions, and farmers'
rights to continue using protected varieties, the PPV Bill is not really a
"farmers' rights protection" bill.
DOES THE PPV BILL PROTECT THE SMALL SEED SECTOR?
Even within the formal seed sector, the PPV Bill is likely to benefit large
private corporate houses more than the public sector or the small-scale seed
industry. Public sector seed breeding has been the backbone of official
agricultural programmes. Though these programmes have suffered from the bias
against the farmer being at the centre of research and development, pointed
out above, they have at least been motivated by public needs, including
those of marginal farming areas. Secondly, reaching seeds to farmers has
been done mainly by small-scale seed industries. The PPV Bill not only
acknowledges a move away from this, but in fact encourages it. The
Background Note with the Bill states that the public research system will
have to be made more "self-sustainable" due to "decreasing levels of
government support" (itself an outcome of so-called structural adjustment
programmes with IMF, World Bank and other agencies requiring a cut in
government expenditure, never mind its social consequences). Doing this
through intellectual property rights is a sure-fire way of increasing the
role of the private sector, both in itself and in funding research within
public institutions such as our agricultural universities. Partly due to the
PPV Bill, and partly due to other trends, we will see more and more
corporate interests showing up in our seed breeding programme. A serious
question that we must ask is: will this really benefit our farming
populations, especially those in so-called 'marginal' areas where profit
margins for private companies may be extremely low if not negative? And if
the small-scale seed sector has to pay increasing amounts of royalties to
the big breeders, will they be able to cope with the competition from big
seed industries, including the multinationals that are coming into India?
Perhaps one of the major thrusts behind the PPV Bill is stated in its
Statement of Objects and Reasons: "in the absence of plant breeders' rights,
foreign companies would be hesitant to organise buy-back production of seeds
in India for export to their countries for fear of unauthorised use of their
genetic material." Two other stated reasons along with this one --- "better
and mission-oriented research for development of varieties that are fully
suited to a given agro-climatic region", and protection of Indian breeders'
varieties while giving them access to foreign germplasm --- hardly cut ice.
As argued above, many agro-climatic regions are hardly likely to be served
by a system increasingly tending towards privatised, market-oriented R&D. As
for protecting Indian varieties, what I am going to suggest below as a truly
sui generis system may have a better chance of achieving this without the
pitfalls of a breeder-oriented IPR system.
WILL THE PPV BILL PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND BIODIVERSITY?
Progressive clauses in the PPV Bill give to the government the right to
refuse or revoke registration of a variety that may in some way be contrary
to "public interest", or whose commercial exploitation may be harmful to
human/animal/plant health and the environment. These provisions stem
directly from similar clauses in TRIPs. However, will these really be
effective?
In extreme cases, they may be. For instance, the PPV Bill prohibits
registration of varieties which uses genes involving the terminator
technology (which renders a crop sterile after the first generation), an
undoubtedly laudable provision. However, there are many other ways in which
registered varieties, in particular those produced through the new
biotechnologies of genetic manipulation, may be harmful. Unfortunately, the
PPV Bill has no provision to ensure that a thorough Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) is done of the variety proposed for registration. Perhaps
an existing notification regarding the use of Genetically Modified Organisms
will help in this, but this does not cover the problem of new varieties
displacing existing crop diversity and narrowing the genetic base. Without
and EIA requirement, how will the Authority know whether the variety's
commercial exploitation could lead to such harm?
In a way, all seeds on which IPRs are obtained should be suspect. For
obtaining protection under the PPV Bill will be an expensive proposition,
and the holders will surely want to push their registered varieties into as
large a farming population as possible. What is happening already with the
Green Revolution thrust --- the pushing out of a large diversity of
indigenous crop varieties that farmers had been growing and their
replacement by a handful of formal sector generated varieties --- will only
increase with the introduction of plant breeders' rights. In this sense, the
government's following argument (made in the Background Note) is rather
suspect: that the PPV Bill will lead to "varieties from different
geographical areas and growing in different timeframes will be brought on a
common platform for breeding purposes…(and) result in new genetic
combinations…The fear of narrowing the genetic base can be allayed by in
situ preservation of plant varieties" It is precisely such in situ (on
farmers' fields) preservation and use of plant varieties that will suffer
with the introduction of privatised IPRs.
WHY UPOV?
The PPV Bill is explicitly modeled after the UPOV regime of plant breeders'
rights. This itself reveals its bias, for UPOV was and remains explicitly
oriented towards protecting formal sector plant breeders, not farmers. While
the 1978 version of this agreement provides limited exemption to farmers and
researchers, the 1991 amended version has narrowed this down, allowing
countries to remove such exemptions if they so want. A number of countries
have already done eliminated farmers' rights or are in the process of doing
so.
The PPV Bill has explicit provisions to guard against such a move, such as
farmers' rights, compulsory licensing, and so on. The government has clearly
stated, in the Background Note, that what is an "effective" system of plant
variety protection (as required by TRIPs) should be determined nationally,
not in international forums. If such provisions are retained, the danger of
farmers' rights getting further compromised are remote. But the fear
remains: once on this path of privatised IPRs, what is to stop future
governments from further giving in to international demands and the pressure
of the big seed industry, and applying the 1991 model of UPOV?
It is, therefore, objectionable that India should have gone into a UPOV kind
of legislation in the first place. There was no need for this, even under
the TRIPs clauses. TRIPs clearly allows each country to have its own sui
generis system of the plant variety protection; India could well have gone
into a radical alternative system that protected the rights of its farmers,
and preserved our tradition of not accepting privatised IPRs on life forms
and related knowledge. Such a system is sketched out below…it may even be
possible to evolve this through appropriate modifications in the PPV Bill.
AN ALTERNATIVE SUI GENERIS SYSTEM
Any system of plant variety protection that aims to achieve food security
and enhancement of the genetic base, and other laudable objectives claimed
for the PPV Bill, should start with explicit provisions aimed at farmers and
farming communities. Formal sector breeder rights should only come as a
corollary to this, and should not be oriented towards monopolistic,
privatised IPRs. At the very least, such a legislation would have the
following provisions:
While a comprehensive new legislation would be ideal, at the very least the
PPV Bill needs to be modified to integrate the above provisions, in the
following ways:
It is interesting that simultaneous to the development of the PPV Bill, the
Government of India has developed a draft Biological Diversity Act that
contains provisions for protecting indigenous knowledge and
agro-biodiversity. A comparision of the two bills shows certain basic
contradictions, that need to be resolved. As currently drafted, the BDA is a
much stronger vehicle to achieving environmental sustainability, social
justice, and food security, than is the PPV Bill. But the latter too can be
made to achieve these goals, if it puts the interests of the majority of
India's farmers, and the conservation of the biological diversity which is
the basis for all agriculture, as its core thrusts.
India has the option of developing a truly sui generis law which suits its
social and ecological conditions. What is stopping us from doing so?
Ashish Kothari
** NOTICE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material
is distributed for research and educational purposes only. **
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