INSIDE

Last July, despite US attempts to prevent it, the Codex decided to more formally address GE foods. The primary purpose of this meeting was to inaugurate the Task Force which Codex established, develop its work plan for the next four years, and stake out basic positions and issues. It was chaired by the host country, Japan, as usual. Most of the debate was on the Task Force's mandate and terms of reference. The United States, throughout, urged a narrow focus on the safety and nutritional factors of genetically engineered (GE) plants; Malaysia, Norway, several of the EU countries, for example, took much more socially responsive positions.

The first morning, Renske circulated the NGO letter (signed by about 230 organizations and individuals from 31countries) addressed to Codex Executive Committee Chair Thomas Billy (of the US). This letter critiqued the Codex summary document which purported to interpret the Biosafety Protocol, particularly its discussion of the Precautionary Principle, the relation of the Protocol to the WTO agreements and the application of the Protocol to agricultural commodities. Jeanette Longfield of IACFO (International Association of Consumer Food Organizations) made a formal inquiry about the matter, commending the work of the NGOs involved in writing the letter (CRG, WashBAC, and IATP, by name; unfortunately missing CNI). France and Italy made interventions also supporting the NGO critique. Billy said that the Protocol text was not available when the Secretariat prepared the document (although it is dated February, the month after the Montreal negotiations). He noted that delegates should refer to the full text, now provided in the meeting room, and that he would consider having the Codex summary document withdrawn, which--he admitted--may not accurately give the Protocol provisions. While the scope of this victory may not be momentous, the fact that the international NGO community achieved it, early in the process, is noteworthy in our view. The letter was translated into Japanese for circulation at an NGO forum held parallel with the intergovernmental meeting (see below) and a French version has been posted on the internet and distributed. The English version of the letter can be located at http://www.iatp.org.

Issues

The U.S. argued that many of the possible topics for the Task Force presented by the meeting Chair were the responsibility of national governments and not appropriate for the committee's consideration.

I. Traceability and labelling

Advocates of "traceability", such as France, want to ensure that any GMO can be traced back to its point of origin, or at least first point of sale, to ensure that any contamination of non-GMO product with GMO product can be contained and dealt with and that necessary information can be brought to bear on any situation of adverse impacts (perhaps including liability)..The U.S. opposed including "traceability" of GMOs , saying that it did not understand what was entailed in the term. The Codex Secretariat supported the U.S. claiming that most Codex members didn't understand "traceability" either. France, Germany, Greenpeace etc. tried to explain what was entailed by the term and argued that traceability systems were already in place for non-GMOs. Indeed, as Consumers International noted, the US government (and others also) uses the concept in a number of food contexts (as well as for other safety measures); hamburger, for example, is marketed under such a scheme so that if any sold in a supermarket is found to be contaminated the meat can be traced back to its point of origin, enabling disease to be contained by cleaning up dirty facilities/changing handling practices, etc.

The U.S. (which, by the way, even objected to the term "genetically modified organism"!) has maintained for some time that there is no need for a GMO tracing system because the products are safe and such a system would be too costly. (For example, these are the same arguments that it has made against labeling and that dragged the biosafety negotiations out until 4:30 in the morning in Montreal.) Greenpeace argued that the U.S. was afraid to deal with traceability because it would force the U.S. to deal with liability and insurance issues relating to GMOs. The U.S. said that the task force should not consider labeling issues related to biotechnology products since these should be the jurisdiction of the Codex Committee on Food Labeling, CCFL.

The issue of traceability remains bracketed in the meeting texts. France will prepare a discussion paper on traceability, including impacts on developing countries, either for the next meeting of the working group (in July 2000) or for a March 2001 meeting of the whole Task Force. (If the paper is not done on time, Codex will probably not take up the issue.)

II. "Other Legitimate Factors"

Codex general rules allow countries to use "other legitimate factors" (such as ethical /religious/cultural considerations, consumer concerns, food security, enforcement capacity, and environmental risks) in their regulations, even if these have an impact on trade. It is a matter of international contention whether such factors really exist and if so what they should be. The European Union argued, though not strenuously, for a wider focus to also allow for the consideration OLFs, such as transparency issues for civil society involvement in standard setting. Sweden and Norway argued for post-market controls and monitoring. Malaysia and others argued for inclusion of ethical and religious considerations. France was the most vocal proponent of a broad mandate for the task force. Not surprisingly, the US took a narrow view.

III. Additional important issues

Because these are so well known, we will not report the details or country positions. However, there was "diplomatic" discussion of

• substantial equivalence
• pre-market approval (the US prefers the term "pre-market assessment")
• science-based decision making (and, therefore, the Precautionary Principle)
• definitions (such as "modern biotechnology").

There was a lot of discussion about procedures for dealing with risk. The distinctions between "risk assessment," "risk management," and "risk communication" [originally made by Bill Ruckelshaus at EPA as part of the Reagan Administration effort to contain citizen participation in regulatory decision-making and to erect procedures so complicated that business could delay actually having to control its conduct] are--unfortunately--largely accepted by the international community. (The US now distinguishes something called "risk analysis" which is a combination of these 3 elements.) The claim is made that we must separate out science-based procedures (i.e., risk assessment), as if these are not loaded with subjective aspects.

The Precautionary Principle is being discussed within the Codex Committtee on General Principles, CCGP (which meets in April in Paris.)

Work Plan

The Chair produced an "aide memoire" which attempted to categorize subjects raised by delegations. This was re-worked (in a process within which the US was very active) into 3 broad areas: Tak Force work (including science-based decision-making, pre-market approval, risk analysis, substantial equivalence, Precautionary approach/principle, OLFs, traceability, methods of analysis/sampling, labeling, transparency, etc.); "key principle, concept or definition": (substantial equivalence, modern biotechnology, recombinant DNA technique, GMOs); and food categories (plants, animal, etc.). These were listed and then arrayed against 6 factors:

1. "overarching principle"
2. Task Force guidelines
3. other Codex committees
4. expert consultations
5. a working group of the Task Force
6. national decisions.